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ABSTRACT 
Clinical social workers face an ethical imperative to work with a range of clients, some of 
whom will undoubtedly espouse views and confess to violent behavior that will differ, 
sometimes profoundly, with the worker’s own personal moral compass and the values of the 
social work profession.  How are clinical social workers to navigate the potential impasses that 
arise from such encounters?  This theoretical thesis explores the dilemma of engaging with a 
client whose morality is experienced by the worker as untenable.  It draws on two bodies of 
theory, moral anthropology and relational psychoanalysis—both of which emphasize 
contingency, circumstance, and the role of social phenomena in shaping an individual's 
subjectivity and identities.  These bodies of theory are applied to two cases set in apartheid and 
post-apartheid South Africa (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003; Straker, 2007a).  While these cases 
focus on the extremes of human behavior in a particular historical and cultural locale, they also 
offer a paradigm of what it means to face a client whose morality profoundly differs from one’s 
own and how one might overcome the impasse precluding empathy for the client’s subjectivity 
and recognition of his or her human dignity. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction 
 
I am human, I consider nothing human alien to me. 
          — Terence 
Whatever cultural conditioning we may do, we must remain cognizant of the fact 
that human beings who have been trained and conditioned to be nonviolent retain 
the capacity for violence; as constrained as that capacity may be in certain 
contexts, it can come out in others. It is subdued, reduced, dormant yes. But it is 
never abolished. It is never nonexistent. It is always there.  
— The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit (Konnor, 
2002). 
 
Clinical social workers through the course of their careers will likely encounter 
individuals whose views and actions conflict, sometimes profoundly, with their own personal 
moral compass and the values of the social work profession.  For example, social workers may 
work with clients who hold racist, sexist, or homophobic opinions; these clients may act on 
behalf of these views thus contributing to the violation and harm of oppressed populations.  
Social workers in prison and rehabilitation settings may work with persons convicted of such 
crimes as murder, rape, torture, child abuse, and hate crimes, among others.  The perpetrators of 
such acts may have been guided by particular beliefs and values.  In global contexts, social 
workers in refugee camps may be asked to assist individuals who have committed heinous 
offenses in the name of civil war and related political conflicts.  How are social workers to 
uphold the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics that forbids 
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discrimination based on a client's beliefs when those beliefs contradict one’s own moral compass 
and the mission of the profession?  A non-discriminatory stance, respecting the inherent dignity 
and worth of all clients may seem possible in hypothetical terms; it might be a much more 
difficult feat in practice particularly when one comes face-to-face with a perpetrator who 
believes his actions were justified. 
The following questions guide this project and represent dilemmas with which I grapple 
in my development as a clinical social worker: What transpires when a clinician encounters an 
individual who has perpetrated a morally atrocious act—an act that the clinician personally and 
professionally might consider to be evil?  How do we, as social workers, hold in mind the latent 
humanity of such a person?  How do we struggle to empathize with the thoughts and feelings 
motivating his or her actions?  How do we conceptualize the role of the social environment in 
shaping one’s actions?  How do we conceive of separating the person from the act?  How do we 
uphold the ethics of the profession when we experience moral revulsion?  
In addition to the requirement to respect the inherent dignity of the person, the NASW 
Code of Ethics (2008) specifies the need to honor diversity across groups and individuals.  The 
Code states: 
Social workers should obtain education about and seek to understand the nature of social 
diversity and oppression with respect to race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, 
immigration status, and mental or physical disability. 
Differences in morality are likely connected to an individual's multiple identities, and are 
perhaps “as fundamental as those more common categories of difference” (Suchet, 2007, p. 167).  
It is essential to explore the relationship of moralities and identities—not as theoretical and 
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hypothetical constructs, but as lived realities.  A person’s morals and values, when considered at 
all, are typically seen as the choice of the individual. How might they be understood as the 
sequelae of multiple phenomena embedded in a particular sociocultural environment?  
Lastly, understanding the moral motivations behind violence as it is perpetrated at the 
hands of individuals is important for meeting the social work profession’s obligation to the 
broader society.  The Code states, “Social workers should act to prevent and eliminate 
domination of, exploitation of, and discrimination against any person, group, or class.”  This task 
requires delving into and facing the psychological underpinnings whereby some individuals and 
groups dominate, exploit, and discriminate other individuals and groups.  As social workers we 
cannot dismiss or shy away from both sides of the oppressor/oppressed dynamic.  If we are to 
effectively help those who have been caught in this relational dynamic with the hope of 
preventing future repetitions, then we need to be able to work with victims and perpetrators 
alike.  In addition, clinical social workers have a public obligation to “challenge denigrating 
myths and stereotypes by presenting narratives that both affirm the universality of the human 
condition and describe clients in all their complexity” (Miller & Schamess, 2000, p. 56).  
Apart from the NASW ethical commitments, there is also a therapeutic ethical imperative 
for clinicians to find it within themselves to honor the subjective experiences of their clients in 
service of offering effective clinical care.  This entails struggling “to gain access to that which is 
culturally dissociated, to that which feels unbearable, unsymbolizable, and beyond reach, in both 
patient and ourselves (Suchet, 2010, p. 167).  This process of understanding and recognition of 
an Other may destabilize the clinician as it often involves “psychological turmoil, and moral 
confusion” (Jackson, 2002, p. 257).  Jessica Stern’s (2003) on-the-ground research to understand 
religious terrorists offers a glimpse at the seemingly impossible task of seeing the world through 
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the Other’s eyes, those times when we must suspend judgment.  Prior to her first interviews with 
terrorists, Stern was advised to immerse herself in their world:  
You won’t be able to explain terrorism to others until you can completely empathize with 
the pain and frustration that cause it. You need to picture yourself joining the groups you 
study. This can’t be a superficial feeling...At least during the period you are speaking to 
them, you need to feel yourself ready to join their cause. You need to sustain that 
feeling—go into it completely—but at the same time trust that you will recover yourself 
at the end of the conversation. (p. xvi)  
Stern adopted the stance that “no matter how abhorrent the view of the other, it represents 
a logical possibility for oneself” in other circumstances (Jackson, 2009, p. 244).  What allowed 
her to conduct meaningful research was a nuanced understanding of the daily issues and 
decisions affecting her subjects—their local moral worlds (Kleinman, 2006)—and her use of self 
to shift her own internal perspectives.  Stern was able to accept that she, as do all humans, holds 
the capacity for violence.  Psychoanalyst Martha Bragin (2007) writes: “Exposure to extreme 
violence is so terrible that we want to shield ourselves from it, to emphasize the ‘not-me’ ” (p. 
235).  It is understandably unsettling, even terrifying, when we see the dark sides of ourselves in 
others.  Socially and psychically avowing the parts of ourselves from which we would rather 
create distance helps prevent those parts from being acted upon.  
In this thesis, I will apply concepts from the theoretical traditions of moral anthropology 
to understand the local moral worlds of perpetrators and clinicians and relational psychoanalysis 
to understand the internal unconscious processes involved in the intersubjective encounters 
between clinicians and clients who hold conflicting moralities.  I stumbled upon moral 
anthropology through the work of psychiatrist anthropologist Arthur Kleinman who has 
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specialized in issues of global mental health among other topics.  His scholarly writings speak to 
me because of his non-pathologizing stance that emphasizes the everyday ordinary experience of 
individuals in context.  Relational psychoanalysis, like anthropology, posits that context is 
always relevant.  I have been long been drawn to its integration of social forces with unconscious 
processes in contrast to earlier trends in psychoanalytic theory.  Moral anthropology and 
relational psychoanalysis considered in conjunction offer an enhanced perspective of the 
relationship between the many facets of the social environment and the singularity of an 
individual's life and internal world.  
Moral Anthropology 
Moral anthropology is a burgeoning sub-field of sociocultural anthropology that “deals 
with how moral questions are posed and addressed or, symmetrically how nonmoral questions 
are rephrased as moral” (Fassin, 2012, p. 4).  It explores the moral categories via which we 
apprehend the world and analyzes moral issues and moral debates at an individual and collective 
level.  It is predicated upon the notion that any idea of morality and ethics is culturally and 
historically inscribed.  The leading anthropologist in this area, Didier Fassin (2014), writes: “All 
human activities are grounded on moral assumptions—often so much taken for granted that they 
are not perceived as moral any more” (p. 5).  Moral anthropology strives to bring attention to the 
moral aspect of human experience, which is always positioned historically, culturally, and 
socially. 
Anthropology, broadly speaking, is well suited for contributing to social work with its 
ethnographic practices embedded in the phenomenology of lived experience.  Kleinman’s (2006) 
concept of local moral world is useful for understanding how individual actors grapple with the 
ethics of their actions and how some individuals come to commit atrocities.  Kleinman defines an 
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individual’s local moral world as the ordinary, everyday space of lived moral experience, often 
influenced by fear and power.  This concept gives weight to contingency and circumstance, 
which I believe are essential in resolving the dilemma of engaging with an Other whose morality 
feels untenable.  
Relational Psychoanalysis 
The unconscious processes that arise in the challenging encounters with such an Other 
are best approached through the lens of relational psychoanalysis, which posits that relations 
between people with their many contours and contradictions are the fundamental element of 
psychological development and being-in-the-world.  Relational psychoanalysis is also interested 
in the relationships individuals have with their thoughts and fantasies, their culture, and their 
identities.  This body of theory, like moral anthropology, acknowledges that “persons cannot be 
seen in isolation from the society and culture that have played a part in forming them” (Samuels, 
2006, p. 20.).  In addition, relational theorists critique the norm of unlinking the individual from 
his or her social context (Layton, 2006; Walls, 2006).  Such unlinking “may operate as 
mechanisms of a culture’s dominant ideology to produce and maintain political, social and 
economic inequalities” (Walls, 2006, p. 119). 
Relational psychoanalytic theory also adopts a perspective of the normal multiplicity of 
selves (Bromberg, 1996).  We all have many different self-states that are elicited in various 
emotional contexts.  This notion of multiplicity makes space for the many identities and local 
moral worlds we embody: “Individuals hold multiple, complex and cross-cutting social group 
identifications...[that] are also fluid and shifting” (Suchet, 2004, p. 431).  We disavow and 
dissociate from some self-states when they threaten deeply held identities and ways of being in 
the world.  Identifications with privilege and oppression emerge and converge intersubjectively 
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in unconscious processes of projection and introjection as various self-states are avowed or 
disavowed (Altman, 2010).  
Relational views on aggression suggest that it is a natural predisposition influenced by 
social circumstances, such as the threat of humiliation.  As a psychotherapy technique, relational 
psychoanalysis offers possibilities of how to clinically use unconscious process as it comes into 
focus.  The field considers clinical questions such as, “How do we find a way to an ethical stance 
in what feels like a quagmire of complex competing loyalties, competing identities and political 
and personal conflicts?” (Suchet, 2007, p. 169).  Lastly, relational psychoanalysis has brought to 
the forefront the clinical importance of the clinician's subjectivity and her history of identities 
(Suchet, 2004). 
Conclusion 
While the relational turn in psychoanalysis has embraced a perspective that considers the 
role of social and cultural forces, there has been a noticeable absence of recent dialogue between 
relational psychoanalysis and anthropology.  My thesis aims to create a dialogue between these 
two discourses.  In the following chapters, I will offer an overview of salient concepts from 
moral anthropology and relational psychoanalysis and then explore in detail, through two cases 
set in South Africa, what it means to encounter a person whose actions suggest a perverse sense 
of morality and a capacity to inflict violence.  While these cases focus on the extremes of human 
behavior in a particular historical and cultural locale, they also offer a paradigm of what it means 
to face an Other whose morality—his or her sense of what is justified—profoundly differs from 
one's own and how one might overcome the impasse precluding empathy for the Other’s 
subjectivity and recognition of his or her human dignity. 
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CHAPTER II 
An Encounter with an Other’s Capacity for Violence 
Through two cases set in South Africa, I will explore what it means to encounter another 
person whose actions and beliefs are experienced as morally repugnant.  In this chapter, I will 
describe the phenomenon as it is illustrated in Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (2003) and Gillian 
Straker’s (2007a, 2007b) writings.  In the final chapter, I will revisit these cases, consider them 
through the lenses of moral anthropology and relational psychoanalysis, and link the 
phenomenon to clinical social work.  
In A Human Being Died that Night, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela (2003), a South African 
psychologist who grew up in a black township, recounts her experience interviewing Eugene de 
Kock, otherwise known as “Prime Evil,” the commanding officer of state-sanctioned apartheid 
death squads serving a 212-year sentence in prison for crimes against humanity.  She was 
inspired by two widows who forgave de Kock for killing their husbands: “The image of the 
widow reaching out to her husband's murderer struck me as an extraordinary expression—and 
act—of empathy, to shed tears for not only her loss, but also, it seemed, for the loss of de Kock's 
moral humanity” (p. 15).  Over time the profound divide in their respective subjectivities and 
moralities comes into view: “He had belonged to a world that created violence, I to a world that 
was the object of his violence; he belonged to a world where morality meant the same thing as 
hate, and I to a world that knew the difference” (pp. 19-20).  Gobodo-Madikizela, in moments 
that shock, discovers herself recognizing de Kock as a human being and not only as the 
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perpetrator of extraordinary atrocities.  Gillian Straker (2007) coined the term a trauma of 
morality to describe the internal sense of disorientation that results from experiencing tension 
and conflict in one’s sense of what is right and wrong.  The trauma of morality that occurs for 
Gobodo-Madikizela entails her fear of “intimate complicity” in feeling empathy for de Kock – 
the same man referred to as “Prime Evil” (p. 46).  She realizes that in order to see him as human 
she must face her own demons with their potential for hatred and aggression and also hold in 
mind the psychological, cultural, social, and political forces that molded de Kock’s identity and 
capacity for violence. 
Gillian Straker (2007a), also a South African psychologist, in her article, “A crisis in the 
subjectivity of the analyst: The trauma of morality,” describes her work with Stanley, a black 
freedom fighter in the liberation struggle against apartheid.  He saw value in telling his story and 
found enough credibility in Straker to meet with her for over 10 years.  One particular session 
haunts Straker two decades later: Stanley recounts to her in riveting detail the killing of a 
woman, Maki Skosana, accused of spying for the apartheid government.  This woman was the 
first to be killed by necklacing, a horrific torture method used to terrify those who might be 
tempted to become informants.  Stanley confesses to Straker, not that he participated, which he 
did, but that he felt fearful as he engaged in his first murder.  He expects Straker to condemn him 
for his cowardice.  Straker feels paralyzed as she listens to him.  She wonders how she could 
“come to terms with the atrocity he described as well as his reaction to it, a reaction that 
embraced excitement without remorse,” especially in light of the context, a liberation struggle 
she supports (p. 159). 
In a similar process of reaching a space for understanding as did Gobodo-Madikizela, 
Straker comes to understand Stanley’s social and political positioning relative to her privileged 
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and protected position as a white South African.  They both consider the question of “What kind 
of social conditions must avail and what kind of history must a people have internalized to make 
them lose capacity of seeing the other in his or her humaneness?” (Hage, 2003, p. 85).  In both 
encounters, all participants, Gobodo-Madikizela, de Kock, Straker, and Stanley, were 
“challenged to look at how much [they] could really tolerate the otherness and subject status of 
the other” (Straker, 2007a, p. 162).  In this challenge, each engaged with the Other in such a way 
as to see themselves in each others’ eyes.  Morality was not an abstract concept, but a lived 
reality.  Straker and Gobodo-Madikizela acknowledge the powerful pull to dissociate, split, and 
project badness onto the Other.  In their face-to-face encounter with evil, they strove to 
overcome these forces in order to preserve their humanity and restore humanity to the Other.  
According to the moral anthropologist Didier Fassin (2007), “It is never superfluous to 
demonstrate interest in the Other” (p. xii).  He describes how political anesthesia denies the 
relevance of the Other; in the case of acts of violence, such anesthesia manifests as the 
essentialist view of a bad person doing bad things.  Members of a society fail to own their 
complicity in the construction of violent individuals when attempts are not made to understand 
the complex psychological and social phenomena that create circumstances for individuals and 
groups to perpetrate violence.  As Straker (2007a) argues, there is no such thing as existential 
innocence: “Individuals are always enfolded in discourses that precede and shape our drives, 
desires, and decisions” (p. 163).  She affirms that while there are indeed innocent victims, 
violence always has a historical context.  Intellectual, emotional, and moral retreat from 
otherness is an option, yet one not without significant consequences.  
While the examples described above are set within the context of apartheid/post-
apartheid South Africa, I believe, as do Fassin, Straker, and Gobodo-Madikizela, that “the South 
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African history sheds light on many realities beyond South Africa” (Fassin, 2007; p. xx).  The 
two cases probe the extraordinary situations of murder and torture; however, there are many 
encounters in clinical work where recognition for the Other’s subjectivity is similarly threatened 
by the challenge of moral difference.   
I came upon these two cases a few years ago and have kept them in mind throughout my 
training to become a clinical social worker.  The challenge of helping a client for whom on some 
level we resist feelings of empathy fascinates me on many levels—intellectual, pragmatic, and 
ethical.  What draws many to the field, I believe, are a natural curiosity about peoples’ lives, an 
innate ability for empathic connection, and, perhaps above all, a desire to help.  These three 
qualities often align when working with clients.  However, we cannot always choose with whom 
we work and even if we could, I believe something would be lost from not examining why there 
are certain individuals with whom we would prefer not to engage, understand, and potentially 
help.  There is also the possibility of discovering a client’s moral transgressions after a treatment 
is already underway and in which an attachment has been established, similar to the situation in 
which Straker found herself.  I have wondered who those individuals are for me: Rapists? 
Murderers?   Child abusers?  I certainly believe I would be challenged to work with clients who 
professed to acts that fragrantly violated the normative standards of ethical human conduct, but I 
cannot say that the reasons for the challenge are necessarily obvious.  Would I not believe they 
are deserving of clinical help?  Would I find it vicariously traumatizing to listen to their stories 
of perpetration?  Would their behaviors morally repulse me to the point I could not be an 
effective clinician?  Or would I not want to face the reality of their lives that led them to commit 
such behavior?  For if I did face how their lives were shaped by a multitude of social and 
psychological forces, I might have to examine the alarming perspective that “given a similar 
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history and background [I] might find [myself] in the other’s place” (Hage, 2003, p. 87).2  How 
might I move past such distressing reactions?  I have not yet had sufficient clinical opportunities 
to answer these questions in vivo; however, I am inspired by the efforts of Gillian Straker and 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela in their respective cases because they pushed themselves to examine 
what it truly means to listen to and attempt to understand a person each experienced as morally 
compromised.  Gobodo-Madikizela poses and considers the unsettling question of, “What does it 
mean when we discover that the incarnation of evil is as frighteningly human as we are?” 
I believe that we, as clinical social workers, owe it to our future clients regardless of who 
they may be to probe what it means to train “one’s imagination to go visiting” (Arendt, 1982, as 
cited in Jackson, 2009, p. 241).  Facing the dark places inside ourselves may be just what is 
needed to connect to those we would rather avoid.   
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CHAPTER III 
Moral Anthropology 
Introduction 
 Moral anthropology, a specific yet broadly encompassing sub-field of cultural 
anthropology, is well suited to address social work’s curiosity about the role of the social 
environment in shaping an individual’s morality and actions.  The recent “ethical” or “moral 
turn” within the field attends not to debates of universalism versus relativism but to “the 
everydayness of the moral experience” (Zigon & Throop, 2014, p. 3).  This approach focuses on 
the micro contexts of an individual’s daily experience while fully acknowledging the role of 
macro phenomena including the historic, economic, and political conditions.  According to 
Kleinman (1999), “Experience is moral because it is the medium of engagement in everyday life 
in which things are at stake and in which ordinary people are deeply engaged stake-holders who 
have important things to lose, to gain, and to preserve” (p. 362).  Clinical social workers 
routinely listen to and seek to understand what is at stake in their clients’ lives.  A theoretical 
framework of moral experience thus has clinical relevance.   
Zigon and Throop (2014) in their introduction to a special issue of Ethos on “Moral 
Experience” lament that much social science theorizing about morality and ethics has occurred at 
an abstract level while neglecting “the nitty-gritty complexity of actual persons interacting with 
one another, as well as other objects and beings, in relations of intersubjectivity” (p. 1).  It is here 
that moral anthropology establishes its niche.  Concepts and methods germane to moral 
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anthropology can help clinical social workers conceptualize the role of social forces in shaping 
an individual's actions. 
Ethnography: Moral Anthropology’s Method of Inquiry 
Similarities between the methods of ethnography and clinical social work demonstrate 
why anthropology as a discipline offers a relevant perspective on concerns within social work.  
Biehl (2005) sees anthropology’s value in “its openness to theories, its relentless empiricism and 
its existentialism as it faces events and the dynamism of lived experience and tries to give them a 
form” (p. 15).  Such relentless empiricism is brought to life by the long-term grounded 
immersion in others’ lives—in their local worlds (Kleinman's (1999) concept for the micro-
context where everyday life occurs).  Ethnography, when conducted thoughtfully, does not 
reduce the complexity of human lives to mere abstractions.  Instead it attends to the detailed 
“empirical evidence that emerges when people express their most pressing and ordinary 
concerns, which then open up to complex human stories in time and space” (Biehl & Petryna, 
2013, p. 19).  It requires knowledge of other forms of communications and openness to 
unfamiliar symbols of meaning and interpretations of experience.  Clinical social work and 
ethnography draw on similar sensibilities of curiosity and inquiry.  To understand another 
person's experiences to the best of our ability, clinical social workers should be open to shifting 
their internalized framework of understanding to embrace emergent and perhaps unfamiliar ways 
of being-in-the-world.  
Kleinman brings the similarities between the two fields closer to the surface when he 
highlights “the ethnographer's self-reflective criticism of her own positioning and its limitations; 
her hesitancy to prescribe interventions, at least until their human consequences can be better 
understood; her newly emergent readiness to make a commitment not just to study others, but to 
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engage them and to witness their problems” (Kleinman, 2014, p. 259).  He goes as far as to 
suggest that ethnography may help with “sustaining empathy and engagement” (p. 259-260).  
While acknowledging the impracticality of clinicians actually conducting ethnography in order 
to better serve their patients, he does advocate developing an ethnographic sensibility.  An 
ethnographer, like a clinical social worker, is “ ‘called’ into the stories and lives of others by the 
moral process of engaged listening and by the commitment to witnessing” (Kleinman, 2014, p. 
260).   
Moral Anthropology  
Within moral anthropology, there is limited consensus on definitions of terms, notably 
around the very term moral, and yet there are clear themes that cut across the theorizing and 
fieldwork of this group of scholars: A dissatisfaction with traditional conceptions of 
ethics/morality based in philosophy, a distinction between morality and ethics; the everyday 
ordinariness of moral life; a self-reflexive perspective acknowledging one’s own situatedness; 
and a phenomenological emphasis characterized by detailed accounts of individuals’ experiences 
and their meaning in relation to each other, their community, and their larger social positioning 
(Fassin, 2007; Kleinman, 2014; Lambek, 2010).  
Kleinman’s (1999) intuitive distinction between ethical and moral can be usefully 
applied to clinical social work.  He describes ethical discourse as the production of codified 
values carried out by an elite professional class.  He argues that: 
Modeling ethics as a person’s individual choices, which in turn are supposed to be based 
in deep philosophically and psychologically informed reflection shaped by religious and 
secular standards that seek universal application, simply does not account for the social 
processes of moral life. (Kleinman, 2014, p. 258) 
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The processes that shape one’s moral horizon include the forces exerted by economics, culture, 
relationships, politics, and work activities.  Kleinman captures the always-unsettled complex 
social qualities of ordinary life through his use of the word moral to signify what matters or 
what’s at stake in one’s local world.  What matters may include “relationships, resources, 
ultimate meanings, one’s being in the world, one’s being unto death, and transcendence among 
many other things” (Kleinman 1999, p. 362).  What matters is always rooted in social conditions. 
Ethical discourse in this sense would apply to the NASW Code of Ethics. It is a 
compilation of codified values determined by elites in the field of social work.  A focus on ethics 
within social work that is limited to a reading of the Code of Ethics or to conventional ethical 
dilemmas overlooks the moment-by-moment moral experience that is embodied, enacted, and 
spoken reflecting what is at stake for the client and the clinician.   
The local moral worlds of perpetrators.  Much of moral anthropology is concerned 
with acknowledging individuals’ struggles to live a good life, but the field would be remiss not 
to consider the unethical and immoral as just as crucial for capturing the panoply of human 
experience.  I agree with Kleinman (1999), who argues that “from an ethnographic perspective 
what is at stake, what morally defines a local world, may be, when viewed in comparative 
perspective, grotesque, even downright inhuman...moral experience may be unethical, just as the 
ethical may be irrelevant to moral experience” (p. 365-366).  Moral experience (with its speech, 
affects, actions, and belief systems) may reflect a striving to do good, but may also reflect efforts 
that harm.  Dangerous conditions may result when our identities and the values we associate with 
them are threatened as humans will defend and protect what really matters at almost any cost.  
The range of choice may be constrained in such moral circumstances. 
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In his book What Really Matters: Living a Moral Life Amidst Uncertainty and Danger, 
Kleinman (2006) recounts the story of a World War II veteran, Winthrop Cohen, who struggles 
with guilt and remorse for atrocities in which he was complicit during the war.  For Kleinman, 
Winthrop Cohen represents “the despairing idea that society can impose on us a way of living 
that unleashes our anger and aggression in a thoroughly inhuman way” (p. 27).  He tells 
Kleinman:  
I lost my humanity as those around me did the same. You don’t have any answers. Nor 
do I. Save to live with it. To realize I did the worst is to understand how ordinary men do 
bad things. How ordinary Americans were so anti-Semitic at that time. How ordinary 
Germans did what they did during the Holocaust. How all of us are capable of murder.  In 
the midst of war when all hell breaks loose and you are empowered to act with impunity, 
you can do horrors and be decorated for it.  (p. 35)   
What is at stake for Cohen is the existential reality of his moral imagination—he had 
done what he could never accept and becomes preoccupied with his own moral responsibility.  
His story leads Kleinman to ponder where such responsibility lies.  An ethnographic sensibility 
toward Winthrop Cohen's story considers what matters and what has mattered to him in different 
contexts—his lifetime spent inhabiting a range of local moral worlds.  Such a perspective 
considers the historical circumstances of the war, the implications of decisions made under fire, 
the presence of a culture that glorifies military prowess, but belittles mental suffering in its wake, 
the realities of survival that only those in the theater of battle have to face, and to the 
particularities of Winthrop Cohen’s own life before, during, and after the war that gave shape to 
his moral strivings, failures, and never-ending struggles. 
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Conclusion 
What can Kleinman’s narrative of Winthrop Cohen’s local moral world offer to clinical 
social workers working with perpetrators? It highlights the particularities of the lived experiences 
of individuals who have committed unethical actions.  Winthrop Cohen grapples with his own 
positioning within a socio-cultural-historical context.  The unforeseen, unimagined, and 
unpredictable aspects of his experience at times called for spontaneous action that incurred 
serious moral implications.  A moral anthropological approach to understanding the perpetrators 
of violence thoroughly investigates an individual's location with respect to social structures and 
creatively imagines the moment-by-moment experience in which the range of moral choice 
became narrowed allowing transgressions to take place.  This is precisely the task of clinical 
social workers. 
If moral anthropology with its ethnographic methods prioritizes and privileges the 
singular and particulars of lived experience, then such an approach must also consider the unique 
psychology of the individual and the unique intersubjective psychological processes between 
persons as they are inescapably entangled with the realm of social experience.  Relational 
psychoanalytic theories offer a bridge between the seemingly isolated terrain of one's mind and 
the tangled web of social complexity, anthropology's area of expertise. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Relational Psychoanalysis 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I presented Kleinman’s idea of local moral worlds as a useful 
concept representing what might be at stake for an individual within the “highly contextualized 
conditions of human experience” (Kleinman, 2013, p. 258).  Kleinman argues that moral 
experience is always shaped by social processes of which one may be only partially aware.  I 
believe that such social processes interact and overlap with psychological forces, which must be 
considered to more fully appreciate one’s lived moral world.  The psychoanalytic notion of the 
unconscious is helpful for probing what may lie within partial awareness or even outside of 
awareness.  The “relational turn” within psychoanalysis, in contrast to the field’s Freudian 
antecedents, recognizes the importance of social processes and has the tools to understand 
unconscious processes.  Theorists within the relational tradition offer constructs that “neither 
reduce the psychic to the social nor reduce the social to the psychic” (Layton, 2007, p. 146).   
Relational Psychoanalysis 
Relational psychoanalysis grew out of the object relations tradition, self psychology and 
interpersonal psychoanalysis, and draws on developments from infant attachment research, 
feminist theory, social constructivism, and post-modernism.  While those who identify as 
relational psychoanalysts represent a heterogeneous group who borrow from other 
psychoanalytic traditions to varying degrees, common themes across clinicians and theorists 
20 
 
include an integration of intrapsychic and interpersonal dimensions of experience, the co-
creation of meaning, the centrality of social relationships and intersubjectivity in development 
and in the clinical dyad, and recognition of the importance of culture and the broader social 
environment in shaping both conscious and unconscious processes.  Many foundational concepts 
in psychoanalysis, such as transference and countertransference, the repetition compulsion and 
aggression, remain relevant but are reinterpreted from a relational perspective. 
Broadly speaking, contemporary psychoanalytic thought has shifted on a clinical level 
from a focus on infantile fantasies to an elaboration of the patient’s sense of personal meaning, 
and, on a metatheoretical level, “from a representation and reflection of the underlying structure 
of the patient's mind to a construction, an interpretation of the patient’s experience” (Mitchell, 
1993, p. 67).  The shift in metatheory was motivated by the rise of a hermeneutic/constructivist 
perspective that posits that we only come to know reality through our experience of it, which is 
“inevitably organized in terms of our ideas, our assumptions, our wishes” (Mitchell, p. 57).  
From this angle, human experience is fundamentally ambiguous; “its meaning is not inherent or 
apparent,” but rather “lends itself to multiple understandings, multiple interpretations” (Mitchell, 
p. 58).  
Theoretical developments from relational psychoanalysis offer a frame to understand the 
psychological motivations underlying aggression and violence to assist clinical social workers 
who are faced with an Other’s moral transgressions.  They also offer valuable insights into how 
clinicians might make use of unconscious process in clinical encounters—the client’s, their own, 
and what arises intersubjectively.  The view within this tradition is that “psychotherapy is not a 
procedure performed upon one person by another; it is a dialogue between personal universes, 
and it transforms both” (Atwood, 2015, p. 152).   
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Relational Psychoanalytic Views on Aggression and Violence 
Stephen Mitchell, a founder of the relational tradition, offers an integrative perspective on 
aggression that is emblematic of the field.  Aggression is one of the most controversial topics 
within psychoanalytic history and not without reason.  According to Mitchell (1993), “How one 
understands the origins of aggression determines one's positions on many of the most 
problematic features of life: historical, philosophical, political, and theological” (p. 152).  He 
argues that the issue of aggression’s nature and origins is not simply an intellectual exercise, but 
also a framing of our individual experience:  
How one thinks and experiences the roots of evil and cruelty, the darker passions, is an 
important part of the shaping of the personal self...Where does one place oneself within 
one's own life historical events? How does one understand one's own motives? Explain 
one’s own cruelties and betrayals? (p. 152) 
Mitchell traces two lines of psychoanalytic contributions—aggression as a drive and 
aggression as a secondary reaction—before reaching his relational perspective that makes space 
for both views.  
Aggression is characterized as a biological “individually constituted, pre-wired potential” 
that is “evoked by circumstances perceived subjectively as threatening or endangering” (p.161).  
In Mitchell’s view, feelings of endangerment are universal to the human condition and are 
always a subjective experience regardless of the validity of the threat.  Any assessment and 
reaction to threatening stimuli is unavoidably subjective because it is rooted in an individual’s 
biological predisposition and object relations (the psychological landscape shaped by the 
internalization of early relationships).  This subjective component does not negate or diminish 
the reality of the external conditions that may be more or less likely to elicit aggression and 
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violence.  Instead this perspective implies that “aggression is never simply reducible to external 
causes” (p. 167).  The external conditions do however impact how rational and appropriate an 
aggressive reaction appears to an outside observer.   
A feature of aggression and its enactments is that they can always be justified because the 
person or group who feels rage, anger, or destructiveness can identify reasons for their reaction.  
To understand those who appear to be chronically aggressive, it is helpful to consider the social 
factors that shaped their early internal object world and how they might manifest in a repetition 
compulsion.  This phenomenon explains how “we all selectively find and sometimes induce the 
patterns we anticipate, and although they may be highly selective, our interpretations of these 
situations are always compelling and plausible, at least to us” (Gill, 1982, in Mitchell, 1993, p. 
167).  
If, as Mitchell argues, aggression implies the presence of threat (real and/or imagined), 
this threat may be to one’s physical integrity or to one’s sense of self, identity, and dignity—in 
other words, to threats of humiliation and annihilation.  Violent revenge on a personal and 
collective level is often carried out in the name of redressing past insults and to an on-going 
experience of endangerment. 
Neil Altman (2010), a relational analyst who emphasizes the racial, cultural, and class 
identities of client and therapist, as well as the institutional context of their work, has applied 
psychoanalytic theory to understand the dynamics of terrorism including suicide bombing and 
the United States government’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” carried out in the wake of 
9/11.  He writes, “Violence is the effort of last resort to restore an unlimited sense of control, to 
dispel humiliation...Recourse to violence ultimately reflects human unwillingness to accept 
powerlessness and vulnerability, a large portion of which is inherent in the human condition” (p. 
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295-296).  As an example he describes how child abuse often occurs “when an adult who needs 
to feel in control, but is rendered helpless by a tiny little child, resorts to the one sure-fire 
element of superiority that he has, physical force” (p. 299).  While not every victim “turns the 
tables” and becomes a perpetrator, it is not uncommon for a perpetrator to have been a victim at 
some point in time.  In a qualitative study of 43 death row inmates, Lisak and Beszterczey (2007) 
found that a history of multigenerational childhood abuse was endemic.  Trauma research has 
revealed if child abuse survivors can talk and think about  (“mentalize”) their traumatic 
experiences, they are less likely to abuse their own children.3 
Altman writes, “One of the central insights from psychoanalysis has been that emotions 
are most likely to be acted out when they are not formulated, verbalized, thought about, 
integrated with the rest of our psychic capacities” (p. 300).  When cognition is split off from 
emotion, dissociation is present.  Insufficient tamping down of emotional dysregulation by the 
pre-frontal cortex leads to our irrational emotions overpowering the capacity for more rational 
mental functioning.  He argues that when there is a conflict between fear and helplessness on one 
hand and moral ideals on the other, it is imperative to hold in mind the emotional dynamics of 
the situation so that feelings of aggression to ward off the fear do not override the capacity to 
make a choice regarding how one acts.  This is just as true for the clinician as for the client in 
clinical encounters: “As long as forces of which we are pointedly not aware determine our 
behavior, our ability to choose our course of action is pre-empted” (Walls, 2006, p. 120).  
Psychoanalytic Considerations of the Socio-Cultural Context 
Just as the personal meaning of experience is mediated by an era’s “broad 
historico/cultural trends” (Stern, 2012), expressions of aggression and violence are also mediated 
by the context.  Altman (2010) acknowledges the difficultly in keeping in mind the mutual 
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interactive matrix of the personal and the social, but emphasizes its importance: “The impact of 
one's social position is always experienced through the prism of one’s personal meaning-making 
system, and...one’s personal meaning-making system is saturated with social influence” (p. 290).  
Endemic to any environment are social hierarchies, the nature of which will depend on the local 
and historical specificity.  Psychoanalyst Lynne Layton (2006), borrowing concepts from post-
structuralism, has described how hierarchies exert coercive damaging effects on an individual’s 
subjectivity by requiring “a splitting of human capacities and attributes and giving them class or 
race or gender assignations” (p. 240).  Such capacities include dependency, agency, 
vulnerability, and reason.  The effects of such splitting can be the source of feelings of 
humiliation as well as those of superiority.  She coined the concept of normative unconscious 
processes to describe the dissociative processes that maintain the splitting determined by social 
hierarchies and “pull us to repeat affect/behavior/cognition patterns that uphold the very social 
norms that cause distress in the first place” (p. 242).  The assignment of human capacities to 
certain social groups and not to others “can cause narcissistic wounds that organize the desire to 
belong to one group rather than another” (p. 242).  In clinical encounters, the presence of social 
hierarchies can become the site of unconscious enactments.   
Altman (2010) suggests that the defensive processes of projection and projective 
identification operating on a collective level are in part what creates and maintains “an 
impoverished, left-behind group of people in our society” that is “experienced as other, whether 
by virtue of race, social class, or culture” (p. 281).  Like Layton, he argues that “the acts that 
create and maintain this group of people in their status as underprivileged and other operate 
unconsciously, for the most part seemingly without anyone's intention” (p. 281).  Individuals and 
groups are who “othered” by those in the mainstream may see themselves “in the public eye, in 
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the media, and in personal contacts” and develop “an internalized poor self-image” (p. 281-282).  
In contrast, those who can “identify with the image of the mainstream...disavow a variety of 
psychic qualities and locate them in images...of the ‘not me’ group of people” (p. 282).  He 
writes, “These processes serve defensive functions for the mainstream psyche in terms of 
enabling a disavowal of the pervasive exploitation and violence throughout our society” (p. 
282).4 
Returning to the issue of aggression and violence, a consideration of the influence of the 
social environment can be applied to Altman’s (2010) emphasis on the role of early family 
history in the shaping of one’s internal world:  
The sense of personal destructiveness in relation to internal objects, for example, can 
evolve under the influence of a competitive and exploitative socioeconomic matrix as 
well as under the influence of a particular sort of early family environment (which itself, 
of course, is influenced by the cultural matrix.) (p. 286) 
In political contexts of occupation, the psychological circumstances are often those of 
extreme humiliation.  The occupier-occupied relationship is one of complete dominance and 
complete submission (Benjamin, 1988).  Those who suffer the “pernicious effect of repeated 
small humiliations” within a context of occupation may feel a “nearly unbearable despair and 
frustration, and a willingness on the part of some to do anything, even commit atrocities, in the 
belief that attacking the oppressor will restore their sense of dignity” (Stern, 2003, p. 62).  It may 
be that those who seek revenge by committing atrocities, such as terrorists, have a particular 
structure of destructive internal object relations that when coupled with humiliating 
circumstances result in a morality that endorses the extreme acting out of aggression.  To 
consider the converse, why is it that some do not resort to violence under the same 
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circumstances?  What internal and external circumstances might manifest in protective 
psychological structures that shape a sense of morality that inhibits the impulse for violence?    
Clinical Applications: Multiple Selves and Recognition of the Other 
Relational psychoanalysis, as a two-person psychology, emphasizes the clinical situation 
“as a shifting context of reality constructed by the input of two people” (Bromberg, 1996, p. 
516).  It has also brought to the foreground the clinical significance of who the therapist is with 
her history of identities, experiences, and traumas (Suchet, 2004).  Client and clinician alike are 
always immersed in social discourses that can lead to socially stereotyping one another.  Such 
immersion in varied and shifting socio-cultural contexts combined with our own unique 
intrapsychic worlds results in the paradox of multiple realities—the multiplicity of selves each 
with its own interpersonal implications.  As Mitchell (1993) writes, “all of us have multiple, 
conflictual perspectives, many of which are unconscious” (p. 53).  Relational psychoanalysis has 
shifted understanding of the human mind away from the notion of a solitary self toward a “view 
of the self as decentered, and the mind as a configuration of shifting, nonlinear discontinuous 
states of consciousness in an ongoing dialectic with the healthy illusion of unitary selfhood 
(Bromberg, 1996, p. 511). 
Healthy psychological functioning entails communication and negotiation between self-
states. In Bromberg’s (1993) words: “Health is the ability to stand in the spaces between realities 
without losing any of them—the capacity to feel like one self while being many” (p. 166).  When 
certain not-me self-states become too threatening to hold in mind, disavowal takes place hiding 
the dissociated parts of ourselves.  Shame and guilt are often embedded in these parts.  An 
essential element of effective clinical work is the clinician's personal journey to better understand 
herself with her many identities and self-states, especially those which have been disavowed.  If 
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the clinician fails at this task, the client, through projection and projective identification, “comes 
to carry all that is unconsciously disowned in the self” (Suchet, 2004, p. 432).  To create space to 
honor the client’s “otherness” requires a “similar receptivity towards our own internal otherness 
or our ‘other’ selves” (Suchet, 2010, p. 170). 
Suchet (2010), a Jewish analyst, grappled with this very dilemma in her work with a 
Lebanese woman who strongly identified with the Palestinian cause.  The question that loomed 
over the treatment was, “How does recognition take place when the other is perceived as a 
threat?” (p. 163).  Fundamentally, recognition occurs at the moments when “the therapist is 
making an internal adjustment to the patient; the therapist is registering the imprint of that 
patient's state even while striving to preserve personal integrity and equilibrium” (Pizer, 2008, p. 
289).  Preserving integrity and equilibrium can be exceedingly challenging when faced with a 
client whose identities and self-states are experienced as threatening and elicit parts of ourselves 
we would rather not face. 
Conclusion 
When there is space for recognition, two people come to see each other as subjects and 
not objects.  Challenging encounters can involve a collapse of space in which it is impossible to 
acknowledge and work with the difference between points of view.  In such a moment only one 
viewpoint or feeling can prevail.  Suchet, by noticing the subtle shifts in her self-states, gradually 
developed an awareness of the parts of herself that she had dissociated, including identification 
with the aggressor.  By acknowledging the existence of these parts and how rooted they were in 
her intergenerational history, she was able to create a space for deeper understanding of her 
client, allow for the client’s dissociated parts to emerge in the treatment, and for her client and 
herself to view one another as subjects.  Suchet (2007), in summarizing what she learned from 
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this treatment writes, “We must struggle to gain access to that which is culturally dissociated, to 
that which feels unbearable, unsymbolizable and beyond reach, in both patient and ourselves” (p. 
168). 
In clinical work with perpetrators, treating the client as simply evil denies him 
recognition, treats him as an object instead of a subject, and likely is a result of our own inability 
to identify a psychic link with the client's aggression.  However, as Altman (2010) makes very 
clear, “a psychic link with people who do horrible things is in no way inconsistent with absolute 
condemnation of the deed and a determination never to engage in such an action oneself” (p. 
309).  Holding in mind the tension and perhaps paradox between thought and action, similarity 
and difference, is essential for preserving one’s own selfhood and personal integrity while 
empathically connecting with a challenging client. 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
This chapter combines the theories presented in earlier chapters with the purpose of 
painting a more complex picture of how clinical social workers navigate the impasses that arise 
in working with perpetrators of violence who believe their actions are morally justified.  Clinical 
social workers will at some point encounter individuals whose views and actions conflict with 
their moral views and the values of the social work profession.  Reaching a place of empathy and 
understanding, while simultaneously condemning the behavior and demanding accountability, is 
immensely challenging in such cases. 
Clinical social work and other mental health professions have theorized about how we 
contend with differences with regard to gender, sexuality, race, age, and class, but I would argue 
that those of morality and values are often overlooked.  Our various intersecting social identities 
inform our moral perspective and may even lead to multiple moralities depending on which 
aspects of our identities are salient given the intersubjective context.  For example, 
psychoanalyst Melanie Suchet (2010) describes how her Jewishness, with its political and moral 
history, came to the forefront when she worked with a young Lebanese woman.  In a treatment 
with a client identifying as black, Suchet (2004) finds her white South African identity most 
clinically salient.  Morally infused emotions such as guilt, shame, and innocence emerged as the 
various identities of client and therapist came into focus in the intersubjective matrix.  In these 
two cases, the clinician and the client experienced alternating oppressor/oppressed, 
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victimizer/victim dynamics as their social identities embedded with unconscious historical and 
political material interacted.  Identities are always related to values—some of our own choosing 
and others that have been projected on to us by dominant groups.  
Moral anthropology focuses attention on the values assigned to the sociocultural contours 
of an individual's identities situated as they are locally, globally, and historically.  It eschews the 
grand theories of moral philosophy in favor of the phenomenology of everyday moral life.  The 
concept of local moral world is particularly useful as it hones in on—not what is right or wrong 
in the traditional sense of the word moral, which can be remarkably hard to pin down—but rather 
what is at stake or what matters.  Beliefs and behaviors defined by one's local moral world are 
emergent and not simply predetermined by one's ethical codes.  In fact, they may be at odds with 
one's ethics.  Take for example a soldier's experience of war-time morality.  In his local moral 
world survival at all odds is what matters, even if that entails violating his ethical code of not 
taking a human life.  When the contradiction between moralities (using the term to encompasses 
both concepts: local moral world and ethics) becomes unsustainable, the result is a trauma of 
morality.  A related concept has been described as a moral injury in the psychological literature 
on trauma reactions in veterans (Boudreau, 2012; Litz et al, 2009).5 
Relational psychoanalysis highlights the ever-present role of the unconscious without 
neglecting the context of lived experience.  A consideration of the unconscious offers a glimpse 
of the meanings of experience often hidden beneath awareness and thus helps with understanding 
the roots of behaviors, thoughts, and fantasies.  In contrast to earlier trends in psychoanalysis, it 
also turns its gaze toward what arises intersubjectively in the clinical dyad by acknowledging the 
mutual influence of two individuals with their respective personhoods, histories, and 
unconscious process.  The concept of normative unconscious processes helps explain how social 
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positions, identities, and the values assigned to them are internalized; how we unwittingly 
maintain social hierarchies.   
There are identities that we seek to embody and others from which we recoil often 
unconsciously.  The latter are often associated with emotions that may feel unbearable such as 
guilt and shame.  Relational psychoanalysis believes in the multiplicity of selves—not in the 
sense of multiple personalities—but rather that we have many different self-states, some we 
disavow and dissociate when they threaten deeply held identities and ways of being in the world.  
Relational views on aggression suggest that it is influenced by internal factors (predisposition, 
object relations, self-states) and external conditions (political climate, threats, etc.).  Aggression 
can be an “effort of last resort to restore an unlimited sense of control [or] to dispel humiliation” 
(Altman, 2010, p. 295).  The lengths we will go to maintain a sense of ourselves, some coherence 
of identity in the face of real and projected threats is a moral issue.  Relational psychoanalysis, as 
a psychotherapy technique, offers possibilities of how to clinically use unconscious process as it 
comes into focus.  
Moral anthropology zooms in from macro to micro and puts what matters to individuals 
and their communities into perspective.  Relational psychoanalysis emphasizes the multi-
directional influences of the unconscious with our past and present social environments and 
formative experiences.  Both theories are inherently contextual.  In the next section, I will apply 
concepts from these two theoretical traditions to Gobodo-Madikizela’s and Straker’s cases with 
the goal of better understanding how one might navigate the moral upheaval of clinical work 
with perpetrators. 
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Revisiting the Cases 
Gillian Straker and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, both South African psychologists, share 
much in common in their scholarship, advocacy, and clinical work.  In the spring of 2013, they 
conducted a workshop together on reconciliation and forgiveness in New York City.  However, 
their written work, to my knowledge, has not been considered side by side.  Gobodo-
Madikizela’s book and Straker’s article provide a counterpoint to one another elucidating 
different aspects of a related phenomenon.  
Of the many parallels between the texts, one of note is the writers’ early disclosure of 
witnessing psychologically transformative events in the fight against apartheid.  These events 
critically shaped their future encounters with de Kock and Stanley.  For Pumla Gobodo-
Madikizela, the event was the capture of an apartheid government agent6 who was suspected of 
attempting to overthrow the leader of a black political organization.  She was in the crowds and 
cheered as it was announced that the agent had been “captured.”  Only later did she learn that the 
agent had been mutilated and killed.  She realized that she “had been party to the killing of 
another human being” (p. 11).  To her, what was relevant was not whether or not she could have 
intervened to stop what occurred, but simply that she was present, “celebrating” (p. 11).  Gillian 
Straker witnessed the burning of a woman on live television.  Maki Skosana, was set on fire as a 
crowd of black youth attacked her.  She later learned that this woman was accused of being a spy 
for the apartheid government.  Straker (2007a) describes feeling horrified and haunted as she 
watched the killing transpire on the screen (p. 155). 
Gobodo-Madikizela in her role in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) later 
came face-to-face with the widow of Captain Duli, whose husband’s murder she had celebrated a 
few years earlier.  Mrs. Duli testified before the TRC to share her personal history of trauma 
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during apartheid.  In that encounter, Gobodo-Madikizela felt the conflicted internal pull of 
identifying with the aggressor and the victim.  Her interaction with Mrs. Duli haunted her as she 
struggled with her emotional reactions following interactions with de Kock.   
After the killing of Maki Skosana, Straker, in her role as an activist, began working 
clinically with traumatized youth who had been arrested and mistreated by the police amidst an 
uprising that followed her death.  It was in this context that she met Stanley and later learned that 
he was implicated in the very event that had horrified her so.   
Both Gobodo-Madikizela and Straker face an Other with whom they experience 
emotionally-complex and morally-imbued reactions.  Gobodo-Madikizela in her meetings with 
de Kock struggles to reconcile her own implication in a murder.  Straker in her meetings with 
Stanley struggles to reconcile her belief in his goodness with her abhorrence of his participation 
in a heinous crime.  She admired Stanley for his bravery as a resistance fighter and wonders how 
she could “come to terms with the atrocity he described as well as his reaction to it, a reaction 
that embraced excitement without remorse?” (p. 159).  Gobodo-Madikizela struggles with the 
converse.  How could she come to terms with the empathy she felt for de Kock witnessing his 
feelings of deep remorse, convicted as he was for crimes against humanity?  She writes, “Part of 
my own struggle in my visits with de Koch stemmed from my fear of stepping into the shoes of a 
murderer through empathy” (p. 120).  
Straker and Gobodo-Madikizela experience a crisis in their sense of themselves as they 
encounter aspects Stanley and de Kock that shock and disrupt them.  Straker becomes “a witness 
to gross inhumanity in way she had not intended” (p. 160).  Gobodo-Madikizela becomes a 
witness to humanity in a way she had not foreseen.  They both become moral witnesses to the 
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far-reaching and unexpected impact of apartheid and the fight for its demise.  For this, they 
experience a trauma of morality. 
Applied Moral Anthropology 
The local moral worlds of clinicians and perpetrators.  What was at stake for the 
individuals in these two cases?  What did their local moral worlds entail?  I believe that for 
Gobodo-Madikizela, hers was organized around a deep belief in the power of forgiveness and 
healing potential of processing trauma—for herself and her community.  Part of her mission 
included a desire for intellectual understanding of how evil came to be perpetrated by fellow 
humans, not unlike Hannah Arendt’s (2006) work on the Eichmann trial.  The real subject of her 
visits with de Kock was “to understand the inner mind of evil, to follow its thought processes and 
to expose myself to its human face striped of media stereotypes and the easy distance of hatred” 
(Gobodo-Madkizela, 2003, p.123).  However, she was also moved by witnessing victims forgive 
perpetrators, even when they seemed morally undeserving.  Her openness to exploring these 
phenomena, while exposing her at times to moral and emotional confusion, ultimately transforms 
her.  
Straker’s identity as a socially conscious white South African was at stake within her 
local moral world.  She gripped tightly to what was good in her and Stanley and in their shared 
mission for social justice.  As her moral world fractured, she found that a clear sense of right and 
wrong, good and bad was no longer accessible.  She came to learn that her “white guilt” had 
curtailed her capacity to face the full ramifications of apartheid.  Her acknowledgment of this 
“entailed the necessity to relinquish [her] unconscious wish to believe that all was good and right 
was invested in those in the struggle and all that was bad was located outside ourselves in the 
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state” (p. 161).  She learned “at a very intimate level that there are very few clean hands in a war, 
although both sides will claim that some hands are cleaner than others” (p. 162). 
As Gobodo-Madikizela comes to understand de Kock’s life and local moral world, she 
contemplates how his career as a leader of death squads required he unequivocally believe and 
act in accordance with the destructive, violent, and oppressive racist ideology under which he 
had been raised.  By not questioning it, he had maintained a coherent identity at the expense of 
his ethical and spiritual survival.  She wonders how his history of childhood abuse may have left 
him vulnerable to a climate of indoctrination with a reoriented sense of morality.  She also 
examines the insidious and sophisticated theological vocabulary used by religious organizations 
to “disguise the naked evil” of the apartheid system (p. 59).  In the following passage, she 
considers the moral and psychological implications of living under an oppressive political 
regime:  
...in a totalitarian society where power structures exert a tremendous influence on how 
and what one thinks, the relationship between personal choice and societal pressure is not 
straightforward. Add to this a deeply stratified society, such as radically divided South 
Africa, where starting well before one's capacity even to make moral choices has been 
tested, one's sense of moral obligation toward others is rigidly channeled along lines of 
‘us’ versus ‘them,’ and the images of the ‘them’ depict a group that exists only as 
objectified others. Then choosing to value or not to value another takes on an even 
layered meaning. (p. 130)   
Under such conditions, it may be impossible to shield oneself from the violence of state-
sponsored oppression even as a member of the privileged group.  Gobodo-Madikizela bravely 
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examines what choices may or may not have been available to de Kock and implicitly puts 
herself in his shoes:  
Should he have resisted such forces as apartheid’s legalization of violence and the silent 
support by a society that benefited from the violence? Of course he should have. But 
could he have? Did he have the conviction to oppose the system he served? Did he have 
any of the unique resources that only the morally courageous—the few who have the 
courage to follow their conscience—possess in totalitarian societies? That one is not 
confronted with the choices de Kock could have or could not have made, that one was not 
a member of the privileged class in apartheid South Africa are matters of sheer grace. (p. 
57) 
However, the possibility of understanding de Kock does not eliminate the need for his 
moral accountability according to Gobodo-Madikizela.  During his prison sentence when he 
meets with Gobodo-Madikizela, his local moral world has shifted to suffering the burden of his 
deep and paralyzing moral injuries.  In the wake of his participation in the TRC, his remorse is 
unearthed realigning his previously evil local moral world to one owning up to his moral failings.  
Stanley, a politically active young black man, held multiple identities: A “brave, true, and 
in control” soldier in the liberation struggle and as a brother and son who endangered his family 
with his activism (Straker, 2007a, p. 156).  To those in power in the apartheid state, he embodied 
“Black Africa...a region that is inert, brutal, uncivilized, in a word, savage (Fanon, 1963, as cited 
in White, 2007, p. 175).  His identities conflict in ways that narrow his local moral world.  
Maintaining his sense of bravery as a soldier in a male-dominated and group-oriented 
environment while facing real dangers to his physical safety, left no room for emotional or 
spiritual vulnerability.  His desire to resist the racist identity imposed on him by whites and to 
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defend his comrades who had been killed and humiliated overrode other aspects of his identities 
that perhaps could not justify killing.   
Just as de Kock’s actions must be condemned as morally reprehensible, so too should 
Stanley's participation in a necklacing.1  However, their guilt and agency cannot be understood 
without acknowledging the social and political context that created conditions for compliance 
and loss of individual conscience.  Moral anthropology with its ethnographic methods helps 
create an emergent picture of what really matters to a person even when what matters seems to 
demand unethical actions.   
Applied Relational Psychoanalysis 
A thorough analysis of these two cases would be incomplete without consideration of 
unconscious processes.  Relational psychoanalytic theory is well suited for this task because of 
its belief that context – intersubjective and social-cultural-historical – is always relevant.  While 
the apartheid system impacted all under its rule, an individual’s subjective experience of it 
developed to fit the contours of his or her unique internal world.  Local moral worlds are shaped 
by the realities of survival under an oppressive regime, but also by the unconscious forces 
underlying psychic survival.  
 Motivations for violence.  In a context of extreme social hierarchy such as apartheid 
South Africa, normative unconscious processes become a potent reinforcement of an “us” versus 
“them” ideology promoted by those in power.  The defensive and unconscious processes of 
projection and projective identification operating on a collective level are in part what creates 
and maintains a stratified society with marginalized groups along racial, cultural, gendered, 
ethnic, and class lines among others (Altman, 2010).  Psychological states that are disavowed by 
the dominant group are projected onto marginalized groups.  In turn, such states are internalized 
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and embodied through projective identification by those in the oppressed position.  One’s sense 
of personal moral obligations develops within the constraints imposed by these collective 
defensive processes.   
Given the psychological conditions at work, it becomes clearer how violence against 
“not-me” groups occurs.  According to Mitchell (1993), aggression implies the presence of a 
threat and thus is justifiable in the mind of the offender.  The threat may be to one's physical 
integrity or to one's identity.  Violence may be perpetrated to defend or retaliate against 
humiliation and loss of power.  De Kock and Stanley represent the possible extremes of violent 
behavior in circumstances that allowed each to morally justify their actions.  Moral justification 
of violence necessarily demands dissociation from one's inherent sense of universal humanity.   
For de Kock, violence was a justified means to defend and protect his group’s political 
standing.  As Gobodo-Madikizela learns the details of how de Kock killed repeatedly, she writes: 
“There was an absence of awareness, not only of one's surroundings but also of oneself.  To 
make it work over and over again, this psychological cutting off of one’s sense of reality needed 
constant justification” (p. 77).  He represents how “perpetrators of human rights violations 
redefine morality and start believing that they can commit systemic murder and other atrocities 
‘for the greater good’ ” (p. 58).  Stanley, in contrast, participated in violence to redress the 
humiliation and destruction wrecked upon his community.  Interestingly, the killing in which he 
participated was not against a white enemy, but rather against a woman of his own community 
who was believed to have been turned against her people by the state. In this way, the 
government manipulated black South Africans to destroy their own.    
The idea that aggression is elicited by external causes does not account for the majority 
of white South Africans who did not commit the crimes of which de Kock was guilty nor can it 
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account for the majority of black South Africans who did not participate in violent resistance like 
Stanley did.  Were de Kock and Stanley both deeply influenced by their respective social and 
political environments?  Yes.  However, something unique to their personhoods was also at work 
creating conditions for their respective dark moral worlds where dehumanizing others became 
possible.  For those vulnerable, personal conscience can be drowned out by a group’s ideology.  
Questions of accountability and responsibility become more complex when the social forces 
influencing someone's psyche come into question.    
Recognition of the Other.  The moments that shock Straker and Gobodo-Madikizela's 
local moral worlds are illustrative of important unconscious processes that can arise in clinical 
work with perpetrators.  They provide answers to Suchet’s question, “How does recognition take 
place when the other is perceived as a threat?” (2004, p. 163). 
After de Kock informs Gobodo-Madikizela that she had touched his “trigger hand,” she 
wrestles with the implications of her spontaneous act of empathy:  
In touching [his] hand I had touched his leprosy...I was from now on infected with the 
memory of having embraced into my heart the hand that had killed, maimed, blown up 
lives...He wanted his evil to be real to me because it was still real to him. (p. 40) 
The morning after the interview, she awoke not able to feel her own hand that had touched him.  
Her mind had “split off” that part of her body; she felt “disabled, grounded as if placed on 
probation for engaging in a prohibited act” (p. 41).  She realizes that de Kock had also “split off” 
his hand from the rest of him by labeling it his “trigger hand” to distance himself from his role in 
“evil deeds” (p. 41). 
In traumatic situations, it is difficult if not impossible to hold onto an integrated sense of 
ourselves; instead, dissociation occurs as we split off parts of ourselves to protect them from 
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contamination with the traumatized parts.  Gobodo-Madikiezela grapples with what it means to 
feel empathy for a murderer and de Kock wrestles with the meaning of being seen as more than 
his identity as “Prime Evil.”  Her relationships in her role in the TRC were with victims with 
whom she felt immense empathy; therefore “to experience empathy for someone who has 
committed terrible acts against other human beings...puts one in a strangely compelling and 
confusing relationship with the perpetrator” (p. 79).  
Following Stanley's disclosure of his role in Maki Skosana’s death, Straker writes of her 
experience:  
I felt the ground beneath me slip. I felt sucked into a black hole. At this moment there 
was no possibility of saying anything or bringing my subjectivity to bear on the situation; 
such subjectivity had been massively disrupted. I felt void and empty. In this state I 
offered no resistance to Stanley, who attributed to me his own self-recriminations. (p. 
159) 
She feels she can only perceive Stanley as an object and cannot see him as a person beyond the 
heinous act he committed.  The presence of vicarious traumatization, dissociation, projection, 
and projective identification only came into view afterward.  In that moment, she could not 
respond, but had she been able she would have wanted to “engage a morality that condemned the 
killing” (p. 161).  Following the session, she faced the dissociative processes that paralyzed her.  
Her “crisis of subjectivity” was the recognition of “how many parts of [herself she] had 
previously split off” (p. 160).   
Straker began to own what she had previously disavowed: The degree to which she had 
projected onto Stanley goodness and hope for the future.  He had come to embody her defense 
against the immense white guilt that resided in her.  Her reclamation of disavowed parts of her 
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self—her privileged identity as a white South African who had been shielded from apartheid’s 
full force and in fact benefited from it—allowed for a deeper relationship to develop overtime 
with Stanley.  This also entailed acknowledging identification with the aggressor.  This was no 
small feat.  In Suchet’s (2004) words, “Whites have dissociated the historical position of the 
oppressor from collective consciousness, due to our inability to tolerate identification with the 
aggressor” (p. 423).  While Straker held onto her moral position that the killing of Maki Skosana 
was reprehensible in spite of Stanley’s sustained belief in its justification, “both of [them] were... 
challenged to look at how much [they] could really tolerate the otherness and subject status of 
the other” (p. 161).  In working through this impasse, they discovered their capacity to engage in 
meaningful and challenging dialogue.  Facing one another as subjects with different lived 
experiences and moral worlds required relinquishing their projections of “salvation” onto each 
other.  Gobodo-Madikizela in owning her reaction to the capture of Captain Duli allowed her to 
connect with a vengeful, aggressive part of herself that ultimately helped allowed her to see de 
Kock as a whole person.  His own feelings of immense guilt, remorse, and regret also 
contributed to their connection and recognition of one another.  The biggest challenge in working 
with perpetrators of violence is when they remain unwilling to see themselves as responsible for 
their actions and disinterested in participating in mutual dialogue. 
Strengths and Limitations 
As mentioned previously, the combined application of moral anthropology and relational 
psychoanalysis provides a strong and comprehensive approach to understanding the clinical 
impasses that can arise in working with perpetrators and more generally when the clinician’s 
local moral world differs from the client's.  The two bodies of theory in conjunction offer a 
perspective that considers how social factors influence an individual’s moral and internal worlds.  
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To my knowledge, this thesis represents a unique perspective combining two cases and two 
theories that have not been considered side by side.  In my opinion, moral and value differences 
between clinician and client have been under-theorized in writings on clinical work.  
Additionally, the theoretical framework presented in this thesis offers a way to navigate many of 
the ethical imperatives of social work.   
However, this thesis is not without its limitations.  A number of theories that I chose not 
to use would also have offered a rich analysis.  Social psychology, collective trauma, critical 
race, and forgiveness and reconciliation theories would have each offered a valuable perspective.  
For example, Volkan’s (1988) work on psychoanalytic group psychology describes our need to 
have enemies and allies, which is relevant for understanding how political conflicts develop and 
impact individuals.  I also chose not to emphasize characteristics such as gender and class, which 
are very much connected to issues of race, morality, and violence.  This thesis, in its emphasis on 
the “ordinary” individuals who come to commit violence under extraordinary circumstances, 
does not address the research on the small minority of persons who commit violence in knowing 
pursuit of sadistic pleasure nor those who commit violent acts during a psychotic episode. 
There are also the limitations of my own perspective rooted as it is in my identities and 
my particular social position.  I identify as a white American woman with ties to South Africa.  I 
have relatives who immigrated to South Africa 40 years ago and cousins who were born and 
raised there.  I have long been curious about the experience of life during and after apartheid.  
The choice of cases may seem distant from the practice of clinical social work in the United 
States; however, circumstances of social hierarchy and political oppression are unfortunately not 
limited to apartheid South Africa.  
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Conclusion: Implications for Social Work Practice 
This study has important implications for how social workers and therapists can 
conceptualize their cases.  When working with clients who have engaged in behavior that we 
find morally reprehensible, clinicians can apply concepts from moral anthropology and relational 
psychoanalysis to examine the impact of social forces on individual lives.  Specifically, 
clinicians should pay careful attention to how their social identities and developmental 
experiences shaped their local moral worlds and those of their clients.   
No one is immune to feeling threatened and fearful.  When we dissociate from emotions 
and the corresponding parts of ourselves, we are more likely to unconsciously enact that which 
we cannot mentalize.  Awareness of how we unwittingly replicate the social hierarchies that as 
social workers we seek to dismantle, allows for greater capacity to help our clients and promote 
social justice.  When sitting with a client who has shared his participation in behavior perceived 
to be immoral, it is important to notice and register internal reactions that may foreclose the 
possibility of recognition of the client's latent humanity.  There is an understandable wish to 
distance from knowledge that alters one's perception of the Other and thus one’s perception of 
oneself.  Considering what really matters to the client can help elucidate the motivations 
underlying the offensive behavior.  Clinicians can hold in mind the following questions: What do 
we do when feelings of moral superiority arise?  What is at stake when we acknowledge our 
privilege?  Becoming more aware of internal experience and developing an understanding of 
unconscious processes can help clinicians navigate the clinical impasses when the client is seen 
as more object than subject.   
Part of this work is owning the parts of ourselves—our identities—that we would rather 
disavow.  From this place, we can begin acknowledging the values and moralities that are 
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intimately tied to our identities.  While I have argued vigorously for a non-complacent stance of 
striving to understand oneself, the challenging client, and what might be impeding connection, I 
also believe it is imperative to be aware of an edge beyond which one cannot go.  Despite the 
best of intentions and desire to push through empathic impasses, there may be someone with 
whom one cannot work effectively.  In such a case, referring the client to another clinician is an 
ethical act.  
While the cases were based in South Africa, one only needs to read our domestic news 
headlines to conjure clinical scenarios where these methods would prove useful.  For example, 
how would one be the therapist to a police officer accused of racist policing?  An anthropological 
consideration of police culture might help paint a contextualized picture of the officer's local 
moral world.  Working with veterans also invites a similar approach, particularly as they grapple 
with their participation in violence sanctioned by war (See Boudreau, 2012).  Acknowledgment 
of one’s own moral revulsion to unethical actions as well as recognition that no one is 
impervious to entrenched and insidious social hierarchies would be important to move beyond 
“othering” the client.  It is imperative to understand and shift one's internal world to counter the 
normative social processes to which we and our clients are exposed.   
On a societal level, dialogue with perpetrators, particularly in contexts of widespread 
violence, “creates the possibility of setting the person’s actions, through testimony and 
witnessing, in the broader framework of the political-ideological context that may have 
supported and even directed his deeds” (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003, p.120).  Finding the 
humanity in those who seem morally undeserving ultimately helps restore the humanity in those 
who have been victims.  Through mutual dialogue, peace stands a chance against the tide of 
revenge. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 South African sociologists Wilfred Scharf and Baba Ngcokoto define necklacing as “the much 
publicised and controversial process by which a car tyre is placed around the victim’s neck filled 
with petrol, and set alight. It became a form of execution in the townships from 1984 onwards 
and was used by both pro- and anti-government groups. It is usually the action of an incensed 
crowd of people rather than an individual act” (Scharf & Ngcokoto, 1990, p. 371).  
2 Hage (2003) in his anthropological approach to understanding Palestinian suicide bombers 
advocates an “ethics of social determinism.” 
3 Lisak and Beszterczey (2007) theorized their results in the context of a culture of masculine 
socialization in which men grasped “onto extreme versions of masculinity in an effort to restore 
a sense of personal power and to defend against the very real powerlessness instilled in them 
through the chronic abuses of their childhood” (p. 125). 
4 In the United States, Altman (2010) writes: “The psychoanalytic perspective, with its 
elucidation of unconscious processes, dissociation, and projective identification, shows how we 
maintain the contradiction between the fact of slavery and oppression and the ideology of 
America as the land of the free, indeed how we could not have the one without the other” (p. 
282). 
5 A moral injury is defined as “perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning 
about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” (Litz et al., 2009).  
6 Captain Duli was the government agent captured and killed for the suspected attempt to 
overthrow Bantu Holomisa, the leader of Transkei, a nominally independent homeland within 
South Africa. 
7 The gendered nature of this necklacing incident is significant. Given the masculine culture of 
apartheid-era South Africa, the human capacities of betrayal, vulnerability, and shame were 
gendered and designated as “not me” by resistance fighters and were forcefully projected onto 
Maki Skosana as a scapegoat.  In the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it was determined 
that Maki Skosana was in fact innocent of the crimes for which she was killed. 
 
 
 
 
